Quotes on Kyoto Protocol
"Estimates of the effect of the original 5.2% cut in Annex I emissions were that they would, if the science is accepted, shave about 0.2 degrees off a 'most likely' warming of about 2 degrees over the next 100 years if CO2 levels doubled---or slow the reaching of that target by five or six years. And it would have made little or no difference for the best part of a century. For that result, 1-3% per annum would have been shaved off the GDP of Annex I Parties (perhaps $250-500 per capita per annum)."
"Several lessons are there to be drawn from Kyoto. One is that there are inherent dangers in employing the precautionary principle in such a regulatory regime, since it encourages regulatory ambition when there is still so much uncertainty in the factors upon which a regulatory regime must depend. This makes agreement on such complex issues unlikely.
But perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the Kyoto Process is that interests have to be respected more if we wish to develop detailed, workable international instruments. Where interests are important, attempts to impose normative and scientific imperatives appear unlikely to succeed."
"The net global cost of the Kyoto Protocol is $716 billion in present value, (b) the United States bears almost two-thirds of the global cost; and (c) the benefit-cost ratio of the Kyoto Protocol is 1/7. Additionally, the emissions strategy is highly cost ineffective, with the global temperature reduction achieved at a cost almost 8 times the cost of a strategy which is cost-effective in terms of 'where' and 'when' efficiency. These conclusions assume that trading in carbon permits is allowed among Annex I countries."
"Now, therefore, be it resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would--
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States; and
(2) any such protocol or other agreement which would require the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification should be accompanied by a detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol or other agreement and should also be accompanied by an analysis of the detailed financial costs and other impacts on the economy of the United States which would be incurred by the implementation of the protocol or other agreement."
"So what do I mean by 'the Kyoto Process?'...
The [Kyoto Process] has been 'codified' by Brenton, in his book The Greening of Machiavelli, and contains four features:
The use of toe-in-the door negotiating techniques, which involve little substantive content but are open-ended and allow for the development of more meaningful commitments subsequently (i.e. the Framework Convention on Climate Change). Reliance upon a scientific consensus to produce agreement (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Reliance upon strong normative injunctions to 'save the planet' which negotiators find difficult to resist (German newspapers calling George W. Bush a 'climate killer'; the Scottish leader of the Liberal Democrats calling him a mass murderer; talk of a 'holocaust' from the Nauru Premier). The activities of non-governmental actors in putting pressure on reluctant Parties---often in fact combining points 2 and 3 in an eco-centric moral discourse, such as Greenpeace's sworn allegiance to 'The Laws of Nature' which it places above the laws of man. This activity is important because the UN is prevented by the Charter from engaging in the domestic politics of its members, but NGOs can exert pressure on governments in favour of UN proposals.
The above elements were all there with Kyoto, and there by deliberate design. But they failed to deliver the goods."